Preserving the Preservation of Opportunity Principle
Ethics, Policy, and Environment (2023)
In Living Well Now and in the Future: Why Sustainability Matters, Randall Curren and Ellen Metzger formulate an ethics of sustainability, conceptually connecting sustainability with ongoing opportunities for people to live well. Part of the sustainability ethics they develop is a principle called the Preservation of Opportunity Principle. My goal in this paper is to analyze the Preservation of Opportunity Principle, and amend the principle in light of certain considerations that are not at the forefront of Curren and Metzger's project. Specifically, I want to develop the principle in a slightly different way given concerns about the noninstrumental value of nonhuman animals, concerns that are integral to a comprehensive environmental ethical theory.
On the Probability and Possibility of Post-persons
Neuroethics (forthcoming)
Neuroenhancements have the potential to dramatically increase our intelligence, memory, motivation, and attention, to name just a few ways such technology can benefit us. But can neuroenhancements increase our moral status, as well? I argue in the affirmative. A higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely given advancements in neuroenhancements. My argument is a response to those who are skeptical of the possibility of 'post-persons', individuals who have a higher moral status than personhood, on the basis that the notion of a post-person is conceptually confused. Moral status, it is claimed, is a threshold concept; once someone reaches the moral status of personhood, one has achieved the highest moral status possible. In what follows, I will argue that just because moral status is a threshold concept, this does not mean personhood is the highest moral status. I will then present an inductive argument with the conclusion that a higher moral status than personhood is likely, given the potential of neuroenhancements. In the process of making my argument I confront the inexpressibility problem, put forth by Allen Buchanan (2009). The inexpressibility problem is the claim that we cannot give an account of what a higher moral status than personhood would be like. I conclude the paper with an answer to Buchanan's inexpressibility challenge, by suggesting an account of what a higher moral status than personhood might be like.
On the Probability and Possibility of Post-persons
Neuroenhancements have the potential to dramatically increase our intelligence, memory, motivation, and attention, to name just a few ways such technology can benefit us. But can neuroenhancements increase our moral status, as well? I argue in the affirmative. A higher moral status than personhood is both possible and likely given advancements in neuroenhancements. My argument is a response to those who are skeptical of the possibility of 'post-persons', individuals who have a higher moral status than personhood, on the basis that the notion of a post-person is conceptually confused. Moral status, it is claimed, is a threshold concept; once someone reaches the moral status of personhood, one has achieved the highest moral status possible. In what follows, I will argue that just because moral status is a threshold concept, this does not mean personhood is the highest moral status. I will then present an inductive argument with the conclusion that a higher moral status than personhood is likely, given the potential of neuroenhancements. In the process of making my argument I confront the inexpressibility problem, put forth by Allen Buchanan (2009). The inexpressibility problem is the claim that we cannot give an account of what a higher moral status than personhood would be like. I conclude the paper with an answer to Buchanan's inexpressibility challenge, by suggesting an account of what a higher moral status than personhood might be like.